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This paper seeks to understand one important Chinese “savings puzzle” - the elevated
savings rates of the young relative to the middle-aged. This was first documented in Chamon and
Prasad (2010), who showed, using combined sets of annual Urban Household Surveys covering
the period 1986-2005 for 10 provinces and correcting for period and cohort effects, that savings
rates for 25-40 year-olds were as high as or higher than those for the middle-aged. This pattern is
at odds with the standard life-cycle savings model, which implies that relative savings rates
should be low for the young, whose incomes are expected to rise over the life-cycle (Japelli and
Modigliani, 2005). The data on household savings used by Chamon and Prasad, and almost all
other researchers examining Chinese savings at the micro level, however, do not actually
represent the life-cycle pattern of savings for individuals or couples because of another important
phenomenon - the high co-residence rates of the young with their parents. Co-residence of
young adults and their parents is common and on the rise in many developing countries. And in
urban China, among males aged 25-35, over 25% are still co-residing with at least one parent
(2005 Chinese mini census).1 Because of the aggregation of savings within households,
household savings will reflect co-residence choices, which also have distinct age-patterns.
While there are no studies specifically addressing the factors determining the life-cycle
patterns of savings or co-residence choices in China, three recent studies (Banerjee et al., 2012;
Choukhmane et al., 2013; Wei and Zhang, 2011) that exploit micro data have focused on the
high overall savings rate of the young in China that are relevant.2 The first two explore the
hypothesis that the elevated savings rates in China are due to the tradition of old-age support
combined with lower fertility induced by the one child policy, which increases the expected
support burden because there are fewer siblings to share support responsibility. Empirical
analyses in these studies have also used urban survey data, and provide evidence suggesting that
lower fertility does increase the household savings of parents directly. However, they provide no
direct evidence of sibling effects on old-age support and no credible evidence of the importance
1

Inter-generational co-residence is a common feature of rural populations in most countries of the world,
but is becoming more common in urban areas of developing countries. The 2005 World Values Survey provides the
answer to the question whether a respondent resided with his or her parents for combined rural and urban
populations for 52 countries. Among men aged 25-39 in China, 41% reported they were living with their parents, but
China only ranked 21st on the list. India, with a co-residence rate of 78% for the same age group had the highest rate.
But even less urbanized countries such as Thailand and Taiwan have overall inter-generational co-residence rates
higher than 60% in this age group. The rate in the United States for the same age group is 11%.
2

Savings behavior also plays an important role in macro models seeking to explain China’s growth patterns,
e.g., Song et al. (2011).
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of old-age support in contemporaneous urban China. Oliveira (2013) provides evidence using
combined rural and urban data from China that total transfers to parents from children are higher
when family size is larger but does not examine how the number of siblings affects transfers per
sibling in China or look at the savings rates of the young. Wei and Zhang (2011) focus on
marriage competition in both rural and urban China, which pushes up savings rates in
households with young parents. This competition, and thus the elevated savings rates among the
young, is exacerbated by the one-child policy, which has resulted in sex ratios at birth favoring
males and thus intensifies competition for brides.
All of the prior studies of urban savings rates ignore inter-generational co-residence as a
phenomenon affecting savings. There are two reasons, however, why consideration of coresidence is important for studying Chinese savings behavior. The first is that, as noted, the best
available data on savings in urban China, the Urban Household Surveys (UHS) and the 2002
Chinese Household Income Project report total savings at the household level, including intergenerationally co-resident households, not for individuals or couples. The savings rate by “age”
are actually the rates sorted by the ages of heads of households. Because of co-residence, few
young people are household heads (only 7% of males 25-45 according to the China 2005 miniCensus), and who among the young are heads (residing in homes without parents) is highly
selective, as we show below. This age-specific censoring of savings by individuals or couples
due to co-residence raises the question of whether the reported age-pattern of savings in urban
China is simply a data artifact and not a true departure from the standard life-cycle model for
individuals.3
The second reason why an analysis of savings cannot ignore co-residence is that sharing
the parental home is a potential mechanism for lowering consumption by the young and thus
permits higher savings rates. If a young adult desires to save, subsidization of consumption via
shared housing can facilitate savings. Given the cost advantages of shared housing for the young,
it is potentially informative to consider savings and residence choice as joint decisions, taken by
both the parents and the young children. Of course, this begs the question of why the young

3

The problem of censoring due to co-residence for studying savings patterns in available data sets was
recognized in the analyses of savings in Japan in the 1980's by Hayashi (1986), where age-specific savings patterns
exhibit similar patterns to those in contemporaneous China and when rates of inter-generational co-residence were
also similar. The similar historic age patterns of Japanese savings suggest that the one-child policy in China is not a
necessary factor for elevated young savings rates.
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would want to save. One reason is marital competition as suggested by Wei and Zhang (2011);
another related reason is the high costs of housing, which would also make shared residence
more desirable.4 Just as urban Japan in the 1980's was characterized by high housing costs, the
housing costs in China are also internationally high.5 Rental markets in urban China are also thin,
due to lack of both tenant and landlord protections, and this market failure combined with downpayment requirements for purchasing a house thus necessitates the accumulation of savings prior
to leaving the parental home.6
Co-residence of parents and adult children in households headed by the old is not unique
to urban China and is a rising phenomenon in many developing countries (Ruggles and
Heggeness, 2008). Inter-generational co-residence, moreover, as documented by Ruggles and
Heggeness, is increasingly reflective of the support by the old of the young, as indicated by
headship patterns by age. They suggest that the reason for the rising trend of co-residence is
increasing housing “shortages” in urban areas, where the phenomenon of inter-generational coresidence is most prevalent. In contemporary urban China too, as we show below, the old
support of the young is substantially more important than old-age support by the young, which is
economically small, and thus the latter is an unlikely motive for savings by the young no matter
how many siblings they have. The absence of substantial old-age support and the subsidization
by the old of the young is not surprising in urban China. Indeed, many of the current old own
their homes, mostly acquired during the housing reforms at highly subsidized rates (Wang,
2011). The current young, however, face unsubsidized and high housing costs, and would have
to wait many years to inherit their parent’s home given the approximate 25-year age gap between
parents and children. Many of the current urban old in China also have generous pensions, at
replacement rates of up to 80%.
Despite the growing importance of co-residence internationally, there have been few
studies of the phenomenon in the economics literature, and none links co-residence to savings
4

Wei and Zhang (2011) also argue that high housing costs are one of the mechanisms through which marital
competition results in higher savings. Chamon and Prasad (2010) earlier conjecture about the importance of high
housing costs for explaining the high savings rates in China.
5

Wu et al. (2010) found that the average ratio of the price of housing to household income in eight major
Chinese urban housing markets in 2002 ranged from 7 to 12 (Figure 12). Richards (2008) reports that a similarlycalculated ratio for the United States and the United Kingdom in 2002 was around 3 (Graph 7).
6

The Chinese Household Income Project (2002) urban data indicate that less than 15% of Chinese
households are renters.
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patterns. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) examine parental assistance to young adult children in
the form of both shared residence and financial transfers in the United States, finding that shared
residence is an important component of young-age support. Costa (1997) uses changes in Union
army pensions to show that in the United States prior to 1940, rising income was a major factor
in reducing co-residence, with lower housing costs after that period reducing the importance of
income in determining co-residence. In urban China, the existence of high housing costs
suggests that income may be an important factor in residence choice, which we test below.
Hayashi (1997) models and studies co-residence as a choice in Japan, but the data he could work
with lacked important information for such an inquiry, such as the characteristics of both parents
and children when families live apart. We build on Hayashi’s work in this paper by linking coresidence and savings.
In our study, we have unique data from our own survey of individuals (twins and non
twins) from five Chinese cities, using a sampling frame similar to that of the UHS and an
augmented UHS questionnaire, which enables us to identify individual (or joint married couple)
savings and not just aggregated multi-generation savings rates at the household level. These data
also provide financial transfers across generations and the characteristics of all respondents’
siblings and parents that are not censored when family members choose to live apart. We show
using these data that the age-selective censoring of individual savings due to co-residence
accounts for a part of the life-cycle savings puzzle, but that individual savings rates are still
elevated for the young.
To explain the individual patterns of life-cycle savings we construct a multi-generation
life-cycle model in which the savings and co-residence of two generations in a family are jointly
determined. There are two important features of the model: the inclusion of housing services
costs and a preference for privacy by the young (residence sharing is a bad). A key implication
of the model is that many of predictions with respect to the effects of family size and incomes on
savings behavior become ambiguous when inter-generational co-residence is an important option
for families as it is in China. We are able to generate a number of testable implications from the
model for how variations in the number of siblings in the young generation affect savings rates,
co-residence, and intergenerational financial transfers; how changes in housing prices affect
savings and co-residence; and how changes in life-cycle incomes affect co-residence and
savings.
4

In our empirical analysis in section one of the paper, we use data from the various UHS
survey rounds, the 2002 Chinese Household Income Project, the 2005 Chinese mini Census, and
our own 2002 survey data on twins and non-twins. We first document the age patterns of
household-level savings by head’s age, and earnings and co-residence by individual age for
different years and data sources. We then show using the 2005 mini census that (i) who among
the adult males in a household is the “head” depends on both relative age and relative income - it
is selective and (ii) for the current generation of urban families in China, the assumption that
old-age support is important is unsupported. The census data indicate that few old report
receiving significant financial support from their adult children. To the contrary, the predominant
form of inter-generational support is the old assisting the young via both financial transfers and
through sharing residence in the house owned by the old. Our survey data are also consistent
with the census data in the patterns of inter-generational support by age.
We test the model exploiting our twins survey data, using the twin-first methodology first
suggested and used by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) and within-twin pairs contrasts in
earnings, co-residence and savings. The former method uses whether or not an individual came
from a family in which the first-born among his or her siblings was a twin as an instrument for
the individual’s number of siblings (the relevant cohorts were all born before the one-child
policy). In the data, this instrument is a powerful predictor of the number of siblings. We then
show that an exogenous increase in the number of siblings reduces financial transfers from
young to old, as assumed in the model and in prior studies, and that, consistent with the
predictions of the model, an increase in the number of siblings increases the likelihood of coresidence. We show that the principal reason is that higher incomes lead to a higher likelihood of
moving out of the parent’s home, consistent with our model and the pre-1940 U.S. findings by
Costa (1997), and that individuals with more siblings have lower incomes. We identify income
effects on co-residence and savings using within-twin pairs estimates - finding that the lower
income twin is the one most likely to co-reside. We also use the same methodology to estimate
the effect of co-residence on savings, finding that, as implied by the model, savings rates are
substantially higher when the young co-reside than when they do not (the co-residing twin, for
given income, has a significantly higher savings rate than the non co-residing twin) but that
savings are no higher among the old co-residing with their adult children. All of these results
together provide support for the basic implication of the model, which is that the high cost of
5

housing, and the willingness of parents to provide direct housing support, is a major factor
causing the high savings rates of the young and their high rates of co-residence with parents in
contemporaneous urban China, with the one-child policy and old-age support unimportant
factors.
I. Life-Cycle Savings, Headship, Co-Residence, Inter-generational Support in Urban China
A. Household savings by age of head and inter-generational co-residence and headship by
individual age
Figures 1 and 2 display average savings rates, and the rates Lowess-smoothed, by the
ages of heads of households in the UHS for cities in six Chinese Provinces for the years 2002
and 2009.7 The savings rate is conventionally defined as household disposable income net of
taxes (DI) minus household consumption divided by household DI. As can be seen, savings rates
are higher in households headed by the young compared with households headed by the middleaged, contrary to the patterns predicted by standard life-cycle savings hypothesis when earnings
trajectories are characterized by an inverted-U shape. The fact that the shapes of the curves are
similar across the seven-year time span indicates that these figures depict life-cycle phenomena
rather than idiosyncratic cohort and period effects, consistent with the findings in Chaman and
Prasad (2010), who parsed cohort, age and period effects using a longer annual series of UHS
surveys. We show the 2002 rates because the survey data we will use is from that year and it is
important that the age patterns for that year are not atypical.
As noted, the patterns of China savings rates by household head’s age are not dissimilar
to those of Japan in the 1970's, but are dissimilar to those of the United States in that decade,
which exhibit the conventional inverted U-shape, as shown in Figure 3 taken from tabulations
reported in Hayashi (1997).
The Chinese urban savings pattern observed in Figures 1 and 2 are not due to any unusual
shape to the male earnings trajectories by individual age, given in the bottom part of Figure 4
from the 2002 UHS, which exhibits the standard inverted U-shape. However, the household
income of the same individuals by age do not exhibit this pattern. This is evidently the result of
7

We use UHS data from six provinces that are broadly representative of China's rich regional variation,
namely, Beijing, Liaoning, Zhejiang, Sichuan, Guangdong and Shaanxi. Beijing is a rapidly growing municipality in
the north; Guangdong and Zhejiang are dynamic high-growth provinces in China's south coastal region; Liaoning is
a heavy industrial province in the northeast; Sichuan and Shaanxi are relatively less developed provinces located in
the southwest and northwest, respectively. The same six-provinces data have been used in a number of studies (e.g.
Zhang et al., 2005; Han et al., 2012).
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changing rates of co-residence by age. Figure 5 shows for urban males aged 25-65 in the 2002
UHS (i) age-specific rates of inter-generational co- residence, defined as the co-residence of the
respondent with a parent, parent-in-law or an adult child aged 25 and over, and (ii) age-specific
rates of headship. As can be seen, rates of co-residence for urban young men are high even for
men aged 35 (26%) and decline from age 25 to age 40. The rates bottom out in the age range 4050 after which they rise again. Thus, as young men age their own earnings rise but they also
move out from their parent’s home. The net effect of the increase in own earnings and the loss of
parental income from home exit in the computation of household income is evidently responsible
for the observed decline in household income with individual age to age 45 seen in Figure 4.
Figure 5 also shows that less than half of young men between the ages of 25 and 35 on
average are heads of households. This means that the savings rates, depicted in Figures 1 and 2,
for young heads is highly unrepresentative of all young men, a large fraction of whom are coresiding with their parents. Indeed, the 2005 Chinese mini census data indicate (not shown) that
less than 5% of men aged 25-45 and residing with parents are considered household heads and
that young heads, almost all of whom live without their parents, have higher earnings than young
non-heads. To assess the selectivity of headship within co-resident households we also estimated
the relationship between headship and a number of individual characteristics for men aged 25-65
who were co-residing with at least one other male aged 25 and over using the census data. The
estimates, reported in Appendix Table 1a, indicate that there is no set rule for headship within an
inter-generationally-extended household, which evidently depends on a person’s age, relative
age, earnings and relative earnings, and independence from family support.8 Given that in coresident households savings and incomes are aggregated across all household members, the
patterns of savings rates by age of the household head in Figures 1 and 2 thus reflect the decline
in co-residence rates by age, the rise in headship by age, and selection of headship by age within
co-resident households in addition to any individual age profiles of savings rates.
B. Savings rates by age from the Chinese Twins and Non Twins Survey
Because standard models of savings are for individuals or couples and we are interested
in the savings rates of individuals, we would like to have data that describe individual savings
behavior uncensored by choice of residence. Our survey of twins and non-twins in five Chinese

8

In contrast, in the Japanese savings data examined by Hayashi (1997), the household head is simply
defined as the highest earning male.
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cities in 2002 provides this information. The data that we use are from the Chinese Twins Survey
(CTS) and the corresponding Chinese Non Twins Survey (CNTS), which was carried out by the
Urban Survey Unit (USU) of the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in June and July 2002 in
Chengdu, Chongqing, Harbin, Hefei, and Wuhan. The local Statistical Bureaus identified
same-sex twins aged between 18 and 65 using various channels, including colleagues, friends,
relatives, newspaper advertising, neighborhood notices, neighborhood management committees,
and household records from the local public security bureau. Overall, these sources permitted a
roughly equal probability of contacting all of the twins in these cities, and thus the twins sample
that was obtained is approximately representative.9 The UHS sampling frame was used to obtain
a comparable sample of non-twins aged 25-60 in the same neighborhoods as the twins.
There are 4,683 respondents in the CTS who completed the questionnaire, of which 2,990
are in matched twin pairs. There are 1,665 respondents in the CNTS. Below we will describe the
characteristics of these data in more detail. Here, we will use the data to describe the coresidence and savings rates of the individual males (and spouses if married) aged 25-60 by age in
the combined samples. Reassuringly, inter-generational co-residence in both the twins and nontwins samples exhibit the same age patterns as seen in the more representative six-province 2002
UHS data, as shown in Figure 6 - falling from over 85% among males aged 25 to approximately
15% in the age range 40-50. These data also indicate that co-residence is generally higher among
twins than among singletons, a result that we show below is consistent with our model.
Figure 7 depicts the savings rates by individual age for the men in the combined
samples.10 As can be seen, while the pattern of individual savings does not resemble the Ushaped savings pattern by head’s age from the census data, individual-based savings rates for the
young are still high relative to the middle-aged. While rates rise between the ages of 25 and 30,
they remain high and then decline only after age 45. This again is certainly not the life-cycle

9

These data have been used in a number of studies of China, including estimating the returns to Communist
Party membership (Li et al., 2007), identifying the mechanisms by which spousal education affects earnings (Huang
et al., 2009), studying family behavior during the Chinese send-down movement (Li et al., 2010), and estimating the
effects of birth weight on adult occupational choice, schooling and wages (Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2013).
10

The savings question in the CTS and CNTS was “Last year, how much was the increase in your assets
(including cash, bank deposit, various financial securities etc.)?” This is different from the method by which savings
is calculated in the UHS, which subtracts total household consumption from total household disposable income. We
compared the savings measures from the 2002 UHS and the savings measures from the CTS and CNTS for nuclear
households, and thus not subject to the aggregation problem in the UHS, and found that the savings rates and levels
were comparable.
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pattern predicted by the standard life-cycle model, but it becomes more like the life-cycle pattern
predicted by standard theory when we avoid the censoring problem due to co-residence in the
UHS data.11 However, we show below that the option of co-residence affects the life-cycle
savings pattern.
C. How important is old-age support by the young in urban China?
Figure 7 indicates that there is a real China savings puzzle - why are the savings rates of
the young so high relative to the middle aged, given the rising age profiles of earnings to middle
age? Recent studies of savings in urban China (Banerjee et al., 2012; Choukhmane et al., 2013),
as noted, assume that a primary motive for saving by the young is support of their elderly
parents. This could account for the high savings rates of the young, if they must support their
parents when they are middle-aged and have few or no siblings to share that burden. Descriptive
statistics from the Chinese mini Census on the main sources of financial support and our CTS
and CNTS survey data, which have information on financial transfers between parents and
children, suggest, however, that old-age support by the young is not currently an important
phenomenon in urban China. To the contrary, in contemporary urban China the predominant
flow of support is from parents to adult children. And the high rates of shared parents’ residence
with young adults, seen in Figures 3 and 6, is only part of this.
The Chinese mini Census asks all adult respondents to provide their main source of
financial support. Figure 8 displays the proportions of male respondents, by individual age, who
reported that their main source of financial support was the family. As can be seen, family is
reported to be the main source of support for less than 10 percent of men in urban China from
age 27 to age 77. It is only above 10 percent for a few age groups, but these are both the young
and the elderly - persons aged 25-27 and aged 77-80.
The CTS and CNTS provide direct information on the total amounts of financial
assistance provided by the respondents to their parents and provided by the parents to the
respondents in the year prior to the survey. This question is asked independent of the residence
status of the parents. Figure 9 displays the annual net transfers from children to parents by the
age of the children (respondents). In both surveys, below age 45 the children are net recipients of

11

Savings for members of the household other than the respondent and his or her spouse were not collected,
so it is not possible to compute household level savings. The respondents were also not asked to identify the “head”
of the household.
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financial transfers from parents; above age 45 there is old-age support. As can be seen, net
financial transfers are almost perfectly symmetric so that over the life course there is no net
support of the old by the young, excluding shared residence, which clearly favors the young, and
direct expenditures on children associated with child-rearing and education. More importantly,
above age 45, consistent with the information from the census, on average net transfers are quite
small - at the highest average level (for respondents aged 60) mean transfers are only 450 RMB,
which represents less than 5% of the annual earnings of 60-years olds in the sample. Transfers
from the young to the old are thus not a major source of support for the old nor a major burden
for the young. Old-age support is unlikely to be a major factor, though it may be a contributing
factor, in urban China motivating high young savings rates, where pension replacement rates are
high, the elderly are predominantly home-owners, and the young seek to acquire their own
housing.
II. A Simple Inter-generational Model of Savings and Co-Residence
A. Co-residence and optimal savings.
To fix ideas about the relationship between fertility and savings in a regime with high
housing costs and endogenous inter-generational co-residence we construct a simple multiperiod two-generation model. Parents and children, when adults, jointly determine their optimal
consumption paths and whether to share the parents’ residence when the adult children are
young. To highlight the multiple links between the number of children, savings and co-residence
we make a number of simplifying assumptions. First, we treat the number of children N as
exogenous and embed in the model two mechanisms that have been widely discussed in the
literature - the negative effect of fertility on human capital investment, and thus adult earnings,
and the reduction in the burden of old-age support for the young when there are more siblings. In
the empirical section we will allow for fertility and sibling size to be endogenous and test for the
existence of both of these mechanisms in urban China. Second, we initially assume that the
children are identical and examine the behavior of the representative child. We consider how
differences among children affect their respective savings and co-residence decisions below, and
make use of these differences to identify some of the key relationships in the model. Third, we
assume that parents and children consume a fixed amount of housing services h. Finally, we
assume that credit and housing markets are perfect and that parents and children face a given

10

housing services price π.12
There are three time periods and two generations (k=children, p=parents). In period 1,
children are very young and we ignore their utility. In period 2, children are “young”, parents are
middle-aged and both participate in the labor market. The children and the parents may choose to
co-reside in this period. Parents provide free housing services h for the children if they co-reside.
Otherwise children pay πk per-unit of housing. The utility of housing services, however, is
discounted if there is co-residence, and housing services are thus a decreasing function of N
(privacy is valued). Parents may provide financial transfers τ to children. In period 3, children
leave the original household if they co-resided in the second period and parents are retired,
earning pension income P and receiving total transfers from their children R to meet a fixed
target retirement income. There are thus two regimes in the model, a regime of co-residence in
the second period with parents paying housing costs and a regime of non-co-residence in which
adult children always live apart and pay housing costs πkh in periods two and three.
The non co-residence regime program, ignoring discounting, is
(1)

max

U  U 1(N, E, C1p)  U p2(Cp2)  U k2(Ck2, h)  U p3(Cp3)  U k3(Ck3, h)

subject to:

N  3 p h  C 1p  C 2p  C 3p  NEq  Yp1  Yp2  R

(2)

Ck2  Ck3 

(3)

RP
 2 k h  2 Ew  
N

where the Cki , Cpi = consumption for each generation in each period i. Note that unlike in
Hayashi (2000), parents and children do not pool income, though there is the option of intergenerational support in the form of shared housing and financial transfers.13 Constraint (2) for the
parents embeds the parental costs of providing (equal) skill E at unit cost q to each child from
parental income Ypi and constraint (3) reflects the fact that the children’s earnings depend on
their amount of skill and the market price of skill w. (3) also builds in, as noted, that the old-age

12

The level of the housing price may reflect imperfections in the supply of housing. Restrictions on
borrowing and down-payment requirements, as modeled by Hayashi and Slemrod (2000), and imperfections in or
distaste for rental markets would reinforce the relationships we obtain in the model.
13

Altonji et al. (2000) reject the pooling model in the United States.
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support burden is lower the larger is N by fixing the maximum amount of familial old-age
support at R - P.
Under the non-co-residence regime, the “young” savings function in period 2 is

S k2  Ew    Ck2   k h.

(4)

The co-residence regime program is
max

U  U 1(N, E, C1p)  U p2(Cp2)  U k2(Ck2, (N)h)  U p3(Cp3)  U k3(Ck3, h)

subject to

N  3 p h  C 1p  C p2  C p3  NEq  Yp1  Yp2  R ,

(5)

Ck2  Ck3 

(6)

RP
  k h  2 Ew   .
N

and under the co-residence regime, the savings function in period 2 is

S k2  Ew    Ck2 .

(7)

The first implication of the model is that optimal “young” savings (S2*k,NC and S2*k,C) is
higher under co-residence (indexed by subscript C) than under non co-residence (NC), for the
same lifetime income:
Proposition 1: Savings are higher for the young under co-residence than under
non-co-residence for the same lifetime income.
(8)

S k2,*NC  S k2,*C

That is
as

Ck2,*NC  Ck2,*C  Ck2,*NC   k h and Ck2,*NC  Ck3,*NC , Ck2,*C  Ck3,*C .

Proof is in Appendix A.
B. Housing costs, co-residence and optimal savings.
Which regime a child is in is a choice, so that the effects on savings cannot be understood
without also considering how the change in the housing services price or any other parameter in
the model affects regime choice (co-residence). To assess how changes in the exogenous
variables in the model affect regime choice we need to compute optimal consumption in both
regimes. For changes in the cost of housing πk, we get
12

Proposition 2: An increase in housing costs increases co-residence.
Proof: Defining optimized utility as VC and VNC, respectively, in each regime, we
have for the non-co-residence regime
(9)

V NC L *

CNC  22h C*Nc  2U k21h C*NC   2U k31h C*NC  0,
k
 k
where C*NC denotes the vector of the optimized consumption level for parents and kids
within the non-co-residence regime. Similarly, for the co-residence regime

(10)

V C L *

CC  2h C*C  U k21h C*C   U k31h C*C  0,
k  k
where C*C denotes the vector of the optimized consumption level for parents and kids
under the co-residence regime and L is the relevant Lagrangian of the programming
problem. An increase in the cost of housing decreases utility in both regimes, but as can
be seen from (9) and (10) :

V C
V NC

.
 k
 k

Thus, for the family just indifferent between co-residence and non-co-residence, an
increase in the cost of housing services leads to the choice of co-residence. A setting in which
housing prices are high, even if capital markets are perfect, is likely to have high levels of intergenerational co-residence.
What about the effect of the housing price on savings? In this model with perfect capital
markets, it is straightforward to show that a change in housing costs would have no effect on
savings in the absence of co-residence, because for the non-co-resident children optimal
consumption declines equally in all periods, by hπk. However, for co-resident young adult
children the higher housing cost increases savings, as the higher housing price in the third period
lowers consumption in period 3 but not period two (the proof is in Appendix B). We then get
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Proposition 3: Higher housing costs increase the young’s savings when coresidence with parents is an option.
Proof: An increase in πk induces more young to co-reside (Proposition 2), where
savings are higher (Proposition 1), and increases savings for the co-resident
young but has no effect on the non co-resident young.
C. Number of siblings, savings and co-residence.
Although the model delivers the result that higher housing costs increase co-residence
and young savings, in part via the induced shift to inter-generational co-residence, it is not
possible to test this implication empirically as we do not have a source of plausibly exogenous
variation in πk. But we can examine empirically the implications of the model for how changes in
sibling size (N) and wages (w) affect savings as well as co-residence.14 The effects of exogenous
variation in N on savings is ambiguous in the model, and this ambiguity arises in part due to the
option of co-residence. The effect of sibling size on co-residence is also ambiguous. To see why,
it is useful first to look at wage effects, making use of the assumption consistent with much of
the existing literature, and to be tested below, that a larger number of children affects children’s
schooling negatively and thus lowers their lifetime earnings (quality/quantity trade-off). We can
show that
Proposition 4: Higher-income young are less likely to co-reside with parents.
Proof: An increase in lifetime income, with no change in the temporal pattern of
income, increases optimized utility V in both regimes. But, because C*k, NC  C*k,C ,
the increase in optimized utility VNC is larger than the increase in VC (details of
proof in Appendix C).
Proposition 4 implies that if there is a trade-off between fertility and human capital investment
so that a larger number of siblings reduces income for each child and if having a larger family
increases the privacy costs of co-residing (hδ’(N)<0), as assumed in the model, the effect of
changes in the number of children N on adult co-residence is ambiguous. In a society such as
China in which joint residence has low psychic costs and housing prices are high therefore
relaxing constraints on fertility (which would reduce the incomes of the young and raise the
price of housing in general-equilibrium) could increase inter-generational co-residence. High co14

We can also test the assumption that the number of siblings lowers per-child transfers to parents (the key
assumption for the old age support mechanism).
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residence rates are thus not likely due to the one-child policy.
The effect of variation in the number of siblings N on savings is also ambiguous, and this
is due in part to parental co-residence being an important option. Indeed, if there were no option
of co-residence in the model, an increase in N unambiguously decreases “young” savings solely
due to the decreased burden of old-age support that is assumed in the literature. This is because
in the non co-residence regime, while increasing N lowers earnings (q/q), as noted a permanent
change in wages (no change in the age-profile) has no effect on savings.15 However, lowering the
old-age support burden decreases the marginal utility of consumption in the third period and thus
savings in the second period, as

dS k2,*NC  2 Ew'( N ) dN  dCk2,*NC  

(11)

RP
dN  0
2N 2

In the co-residence regime, however, the effect of an increases in N on young savings is given
by16:

dS k2,*C  Ew '( N ) 

(12)

2 Ew '( N ) 

RP
N2

2

 UU k312 h ''( N )
k 11

U k211

1 U3

dN .

k 11

Although the old-age support burden still tends to shift consumption towards the “young”
period, the effect of the wage rate change on savings in this regime is ambiguous17 and
relationship (12) depends as well on whether consumption and housing services are substitutes
or complements (U2k12). Thus, once one takes into account the effect of family size on a child’s
behavior in a setting with high housing prices (where the returns to co-residence are high) it is
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However, it is easy to show that an increase only in second-period wages for the young, holding fixed
third-period wages, would increase savings.
16

The derivation of (12) is given in Appendix D.

17

To see this, consider a unit change in the rental rate of human capital w over both periods of the child’s
working life, which increases lifetime earnings therefore by 2E. The increase in the optimal consumption at periods
2 and 3, denoted as

C2 and C3 , must satisfy C2  C3  2 E , and C2*  C2  C3*  C3 . For the co-

resident children C2 may be less than C3 unlike for non co-resident children. However, it is not clear
whether C2 increases by more than E , which depends on the specific function form of the utility function.
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not clear how changing rules of fertility affect savings for the young.
D. Parental income, young savings and inter-generational co-residence.
An important implication of the model is that parents’ pre-retirement or
contemporaneous income matters for the savings behavior of the young net of both the young’s
income and the parents’ pension income, again because of the option of co-residence. In the
absence of co-residence there is no effect of parental pre-retirement income on the behavior of
the young in the model. The sign of the effect of parent’s income on savings by their young
children in the presence of co-residence can also be informative about whether consumption and
housing services are complements or substitutes, which as shown in (12) affects how the number
of siblings affects the young’s savings. First, for given earnings of the young, we can show
Proposition 5: An increase in parental pre-retirement or pension income
increases inter-generational co-residence.
Proof: Higher parents' income at either period 1 or 2 always leads to higher
parents' consumption levels, and hence higher VC and V NC. It can be shown that
DV  V NC  V C





 U p21 C*p, NC  U p21  U k22h2(N, Yp) C*p,k,C

  U k22 h2 ( N , Yp ) C*k ,C  0 , since U p21 C*p , NC  U p21 C*p ,k ,C , where C*p,k indicates
the vector of the optimal consumption goods by the parents and kids.18
The effect of parental income on young savings depends on whether the consumption
good and housing services are complements or substitutes.
Proposition 6: If housing services and consumption are substitutes an increase in
parental pre-retirement income unambiguously increases the young’s savings.
Proof: The disutility of shared housing services decreases with parental income,
so for co-resident children consumption declines and savings increases
(decreases) when housing services and consumption are substitutes
(complements). For non-co-resident children, parent’s income has no direct effect
on their consumption. As Proposition 5 indicates, co-residence increases with
parental income and savings is higher under co-residence (Proposition 1). Thus,

18

Proof details are in Appendix E.
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savings for the young will increase regardless of residence regime when parental
income is higher.19
In sum, the model indicates that in a setting where housing costs are high and parents are
relatively well off relative to their young children, co-residence is likely to be high and savings
rates by the young also high, facilitated by shared residence. In this environment, an increase in
the income of the young generation relative to the old decrease co-residence and thus has
ambiguous effects on savings, which would otherwise rise in a regime without co-residence.
Similarly, increases in the number of siblings (family) size would unambiguously lower young
savings, by lowering income and reducing old-age support, in a setting with no co-residence
option but the effect of fertility (sibling size) on savings is ambiguous when co-residence is an
important option.
III. Heterogeneous Children
In the model so far we have assumed that each child is identical. We now relax that
assumption. We do this because in the empirical section we will estimate how changes in wage
rates affect savings and co-residence using differences across siblings (twins). The advantage of
such estimates is that they eliminate the influence of unmeasured or imperfectly measured
common family variables, for example, contemporaneous parental income or preferences, which
the model indicates affect both decisions. The issue then is how the differenced estimates
correspond to the comparative statics for the representative child derived under the assumption
of identical children. The key additional consideration is that changes in the earnings of one
sibling can directly affect the behavior of the other sibling(s) because of co-residence and the
privacy (crowding) externality.
Consider a family with two initially identical children (siblings) that is just indifferent
between the co-residence or non-co-residence of the children. There is an exogenous increase in
the earnings of one sibling, say sibling 1. We want to know what happens to the difference in the
utilities of co-residing and non-co-residing between the two siblings. That is we want to know
what happens to the difference in the changes in the utilities associated with the residence
regimes across the siblings

DV  (V1 NC  V1C)  (V2NC  V2C) ,

(13)

19

It is easy to show that in contrast an increase in parents’ pension income always decreases the savings by
the young due to the lower support burden.
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when the lifetime earnings of sibling 1 increases.
From Proposition 4 we know that for sibling 1, V NC  V C  0 when the lifetime
1
1
earnings of sibling 1 increases and sibling 1 will move to non-co-residence if indifferent initially.
For sibling 2 there is no change in the utility associated with non-co-residence. However, if
sibling 1 chooses non-co-residence the gain from the co-residence regime increases for sibling 2,
even though sibling 2 experiences no income change, because there will be less crowding (more
privacy) if she chooses to co-reside with parents. The effect of a rise in sibling 1's wages on the
difference in co-residence choice utilities is thus
(14)

DV  ( V1NC  V1C )  ( V2C )  0 ,

when the lifetime earnings of sibling 1 increases and is thus the same sign as the effect on sibling
1's own behavior, with the cross-sibling effect reinforcing the difference in residence choices.
Similarly, it can be easily shown that the sign of the effect of differences in earnings across
siblings on the difference in their savings is the same as that in the comparative static for the
representative child.
IV. Reduced-Form Estimates of Number of Siblings
In this section we test two assumptions and two propositions from the model with respect
to the effects of variation in the number of siblings N and parental resources on the schooling
attainment, financial assistance of parents, inter-generational co-residence, and savings of the
young. With respect to the assumptions, we look at the effects of variation in N on the schooling
attainment of the young E and on transfers to parents from the young ((R - P)/N), which we have
assumed to be negative in deriving some of the predictions of the model. We also look at the
reduced-form effects of N and parental occupation (a proxy for their income) on co-residence
and on young savings S2k. The linearized reduced-form estimating equation from the model for
an adult child i in family j is:
(15)

Zijk = β1Nj + β2Ypj + εij,

where Zijk = Eij, (Rj - Pj)/Nj, Cijk, Sijk. Propositions 5 and 6 imply that β2>0 for both co-residence
and young savings (the latter if housing services and consumption are not complements), while
the assumption of reduced support burden and the quantity-quality trade-off imply that β1<0 for
both schooling attainment and parental transfers.
Although in the model we have assumed for simplicity that the number of children in the
18

family is exogenous, the empirical challenge is that the number of siblings depends on parental
fertility choices and thus may reflect parental preferences (e.g., altruism, preference for
children’s schooling, aversion to privacy loss), which may be inter-generationally correlated. To
obtain causal effects of sibling size that do not reflect preference correlations we use the
combined CTS and CNTS data to implement an instrumental-variables procedure, exploiting the
fact that twinning on the first birth is random net of the mother’s age at first birth (Rosenzweig
and Wolpin, 1980). Choukhmane et al. (2013) used the presence of any twins in the UHS data
sets as an instrument for fertility of younger couples. In those data, all of the children were born
during the regime of the one-child policy, and there is evidence that twinning may reflect, given
available technology, attempts by parents to circumvent fertility restrictions (Huang et. al, 2013).
Thus, twinning (at any birth order) in contemporaneous China is unlikely to be a fully random
outcome. In contrast, all of the respondents in the CTS and CNTS were born prior to the
implementation of the one-child policy and before the widespread availability of fertility drugs.
This means that for any pregnancy the event of a twin, conditional on mother’s age, is random.
However, the presence of twins in any family will reflect fertility preferences, as families with
more pregnancies will be more likely to have a twin birth. Restricting the sample of twins to
those born at the first birth, controlling for mother’s age at first birth, eliminates the correlation
between a family’s family size (and other) preferences and twinning.
The first-stage estimating equation we use is thus:
(16)

Nj = α1TFBij + α2Ypj + α3AFBk + uk,

where TFBij=twinning on the first birth and AFBk=mother’s age at first birth.20 Oliveira (2013)
also used twinning on the first birth to estimate, using Chinese rural and urban data, the effect of
number of children on the total transfers received by older mothers and, using Indonesia data, the
effects of number of siblings on transfers per sibling, finding a positive relationship for the first
and a negative relationship for the second, consistent with the assumption of our model.
To estimate (15) and (16) we use first-birth male twins aged 25-45 with at least one
living parent from the CTS as the randomized treatment group and male singletons in the same
age range and also with at least one living parent from the CNTS as the control group. Both data

20

Rosenzweig and Wolpin show that even if the mother’s age at first birth is endogenous (correlated with u
in (16)), the estimate of the effect of twinning on the first birth (α1) is unbiased.
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sets provide information on all of the siblings of the respondents and the occupation of the
parents, in six categories. We use an indicator variable for whether or not the mother or the
father are in a skill category, defined as professional or managerial, to proxy for parental
resources.
There is one additional issue in estimating (15) and (16). Twins have substantially lower
birthweight than singletons and birthweight has been shown to have long-term effects on adult
outcomes. However, for schooling, for example, the relationship is only important for females
(Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2004; Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2013). Because the CTS and NTCS
have birthweight information, we can check whether birthweight differences between twins for
our male sample matter for the outcomes we examine. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for
three sub-samples - all twins, first-birth twins, and singletons in the age group 25-45. Of interest
is that average birthweight is indeed significantly lower in the samples of twins than for
singleton births. However, the differences in parental occupation across the sample categories is
not statistically significant.
Table 2 provides the estimates of the first-stage sibling equation (16) using all twins and
only first-birth twins as the treatment sample in columns one and two, respectively. In both
samples, twinning has a statistically significant positive effect on the total number of siblings. As
expected, however, use of any twins born to the parents results in a much larger sibling
coefficient, as the presence of twins is, as noted, mechanically related to the (chosen) number of
births. The causal estimate from the first-birth twin treatment sample, which eliminates this
relationship, indicates that any person born in a family with twins on the first birth will have on
average .43 more siblings.
Table 3 displays the OLS and IV estimates of the reduced-form equation (15) based on
the first-stage estimates (16) for schooling attainment, testing an assumption of the model that
the young with more siblings have less human capital. Both estimates are supportive of this
assumption; the IV estimate indicates adding one additional sibling reduces schooling attainment
by almost one full year (8.2%). To assess if this difference is negatively biased due to the lower
birthweight of twins, we tested whether the birthweight differences between male twins affected
differences in their schooling attainment. As shown in Appendix Table 2a we find using the
same specification as in (16) that, as expected, the male twins have on average a statistically
significant .63-.64 kilograms less birthweight than singletons. However, the within-twins
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estimates, reported in Appendix Table 3a, indicate that birthweight for this male sample is not a
statistically significant determinant of schooling.21
In the first two columns of Table 4 we report reduced-form estimates that permit a test of
another assumption of our model, and assumed but not tested in other the prior studies of fertility
effects on savings, that having more siblings lowers the old-age support burden. Because, as seen
in Table 1, the fraction of the respondents providing any financial assistance to parents is only
6%, we look specifically at how the number of siblings affects the probability of parental
financial assistance, using probit and IV-probit. The Wald test statistic indicates rejection of the
hypothesis that the number of siblings is orthogonal to the error term in the transfer equation.
The statistically-preferred IV-estimate in column two indicates support for the assumption that
having more siblings lowers the support burden. However, the point estimate, while statistically
significant, suggests the effect on the probability of providing support is small, because the
incidence of old-age support is small.
Columns three and four of Table 4 report, respectively, the probit and IV-probit estimates
of the reduced-form effect of number of siblings and parental occupation on the probability that
the (young) respondent co-resides with a parent. Our finding that additional siblings lowers
human capital, reported in Table 2, and thus earnings, and the prediction of the model
(Proposition 4) that higher-income for the young leads to less co-residence,22 implies that
respondents with more siblings may be more likely to stay with their parents, even though
having more siblings leads to less privacy if they co-reside. The statistically-preferred (Wald
test) IV probit reduced-form estimates in column 4 confirm this - in families with more children,
the children are more likely to co-reside with parents. The point estimate indicates that a
reduction in the number of siblings by one decreases co-residence by 45%. This implies that
relaxation of the one-child policy will further increase inter-generational co-residence. The
estimates in column 4 also confirm Proposition 5, that co-residence will be more likely the
higher the incomes of the parents. The estimates indicate that in families in which the father is in
21

Birthweight differences within a twin pair are large but are orthogonal to the preferences or constraints of
parents. Using the same within-twins method on the CTS sample for women yields a statistically significant
relationship between birthweight and schooling, so the test has power (Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2013). As noted, this
difference by gender in birthweight effects is consistent with other findings in the literature and has a biological and
behavioral basis, as discussed in Pitt et al. (2012).
22

We test Proposition 4 directly in the next section.
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a professional or managerial occupation, his child is statistically significantly more likely to be
co-residing with him (mother’s occupation does not matter, however). This finding suggests,
consistent with the model, that a policy of decreasing pensions for the elderly will lower the
proportion of inter-generationally-extended households.
The last two columns of Table 4 report the reduced-form estimates of the effects of N and
parental occupation on the savings rate of the young using OLS and IV. The model provides no
prediction for the sibling effect - more siblings reduce the old-age support burden (Table 4,
column 2) and human capital (Table 3), which would lower savings, but an increase in the
number of siblings also induces co-residence (Table 4, column 4), which facilitates higher
savings (Proposition 1).23 The net effect of these mechanisms, to be directly tested below, is that
changes in the number of siblings induced by a change in fertility policy would evidently have
no effect on savings. Both the OLS and IV estimates (which are statistically identical) indicate
that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the number of siblings has no effect on the savings rate
in the reduced-form. However, there is mild support for Proposition 6 (with Ck and hk not strong
complements) that higher parental resources are associated with higher young savings, as both
parental occupation coefficients are positive. Although neither parental occupation coefficient is
statistically significant, they are jointly statistically significant at the 10% level.
V. Income, Savings and Co-Residence
A. Young income effects on co-residence and savings
In this section we test two additional propositions of the model - Proposition 4 that
increasing incomes for the young reduces the likelihood of co-residence with parents and
Proposition 1, central to the model, that co-residence facilitates the young’s savings. We also
estimate how income affects savings. Both co-residence and wages are endogenous in the model
so we need to employ an empirical strategy that reduces endogeneity bias. In particular, we will
exploit differences between the twins in a twin pairing. The “within-twin” methodology requires
more stringent assumptions than are needed for the twin-first method to obtain credibly causal
estimates. The key advantage of the within-twin method is that differences across twins in a
family are orthogonal to any unmeasured or unobservable family-level characteristics such as
preferences (e.g. for savings, human capital investments, and privacy) or constraints (parental
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We implement a test of Proposition 1 below.
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income). Any endogeneity bias due to omitted common family-level factors is thus eliminated.
This is a particularly important advantage for testing hypotheses derived from a framework in
which two generations jointly make family decisions, as is consistent with the finding that
father’s occupation affects his children’s co-residence (Table 4). Importantly, as we have shown
in Section III, heterogeneity between siblings identifies the key relationships in the model.
A principal assumption of the within-twin method is that observed differences, in wages
and co-residence, across twins within a pair are purely random net of the family-level factors.
There are two issues. First, as is well-known, within-estimates are more sensitive to any
measurement error in regressors, leading to an estimate that is biased to zero if there is a single
regressor, or a more complex set of biases when there are multiple regressors. We will discuss
the measurement-error issue, and a method for eliminating measurement-error bias, in more
detail below. The second issue is that the underlying source of variation across twins, net of
measurement error, is unknown. For example, it is not clear why one genetically-identical twin
has higher earnings than another. However, to the extent that the source of this variation is due to
differences in unobserved earnings endowments or ability (such as caused by heterogeneous
birthweight or other womb-based determinants), as long as these are unrelated to the outcomes
other than through income effects there is no bias.24 It is unlikely that earnings endowment or
ability bias would be a problem in estimating how wages affect savings. More troubling would
be if differences in earnings (at the same age) were due to differences in discount rates, which
led to differences in human capital investment, and which might directly affect savings (positive
bias). It will never be possible to rule out all conjectured sources of cross-twin differences. It is
even possible that the within-estimates are more biased than OLS estimates in some cases. We
will test, however, how robust the estimates are to the use of different estimation methods and
samples.
The first four columns of Table 5 report logit and within-twin conditional logit (withintwin) estimates of the effects of wages on the probability of providing a financial transfer to
parents and the probability of co-residing with any parent for young respondent men aged 25-45
with at least one living parent. The last two columns of the table report OLS and within-twin

24

This would be more troubling for looking at how differences in schooling affect earnings, as earnings are
likely to be directly affected by ability differences.
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estimates of wages on the savings rate. Given that we have only one regressor, any measurement
error in the wages will bias the wage coefficient to zero. This will make our test of the
significance of these effects conservative and leave our conclusion about the sign of the direction
of the wage effects unbiased. With respect to hypothesis tests, the results in all columns are
robust to estimation procedure. The estimates indicate that while we cannot reject the hypothesis
that wages have no effect on parental transfers, we can say with at least 95% confidence that an
exogenous increase in income for the young lowers the probability of co-residing with parents,
consistent with Proposition 4 of the model. Finally, in the last two columns of Table 5 we see
that an increase in the wages of the young is associated with a higher savings rate, despite the
fact that higher-income young are less likely to co-reside with parents, which permits higher
savings.
B. Co-residence and young and old savings
A key implication of the model, Proposition 1, is that co-residence facilitates higher
savings for the young. To test this we exploit the fact that within a large fraction of the twin pairs
only one of the twins is co-residing with a parent. Since we have seen in Table 5 that variation in
wages also affects differences in both the choice to co-reside and savings, we need also to
control for differences in the earnings of the twins. That is, we wish to know across twins
whether the one co-residing, for given own income, has higher savings. However, earnings are
likely measured with error, which, as noted, will contaminate the estimate of the co-residence
effect.25 The CTS contains cross-reports on twin earnings. Each twin was asked to report both
their own annual earnings and that of their co-twin. As in Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994), we
can use the cross report as an instrument, in this case for own earnings, to eliminate
measurement bias, as long as the measurement error in the cross and own-reports are
uncorrelated net of a family fixed effect.
We can also carry out another test, making use of the older twins (46-60) in the CTS to
further test a key assumption of our model - that the co-residence of the young and old represents
a subsidy to the consumption of the young by the old. If that is the case then, in contrast to the
sample of young, among the co-residing parents (old) savings should not be higher for the parent
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It is unlikely that the report by each twin on whether he is co-residing with a parent is erroneous. We do
not have information on whether the siblings co-reside with each other that would enable a cross-check.
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living with his adult son compared with his twin who has a son that is not co-resident, for given
own income. We thus use the same specification and estimation methods for the older sample of
twins each of whom has at least one child aged over 20.26
Table 6 reports the within-twin and IV within-twin estimates for the two samples. For the
young sample, use of the cross-reports substantially increases the positive earnings effect on
savings, consistent with the presence of measurement error, as well as the coefficient on coresidence. Both sets of estimates indicate non-rejection of Proposition 1 - the co-residing twin
has significantly higher savings, almost double that of the non-co-residing twin, controlling for
differences in income. On the other hand, while for the older twin parents the earnings effects on
savings are similar to those for the young (regardless of estimation procedure), there is no
statistically significant positive relationship between their co-residence with an adult child and
their savings, and the point estimate is small. These sets of results are consistent with intergenerational co-residence reflecting the support of the young by the old.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper we have used unique data characterizing urban China to examine why the
savings rates of the young are elevated relative to the middle-aged, despite rising individual
incomes over the life-cycle. We show that to understand life-cycle savings behavior, particularly
in a context of high housings costs, it is necessary to take into account inter-generational coresidence. Our paper is the first to link, both theoretically and empirically, these two phenomena.
The data we exploit are unique in providing savings information at the individual level as
well as information on parents and siblings for all respondents. These features enabled us to
study savings behavior in an inter-generational family context in a setting in which the sharing of
residence by two or more generations, as in urban China, is common. We show that the
aggregation of savings at the household level in standard data sets, given high rates of intergenerational co-residence that change over the life-cycle, distorts the true picture of life-cycle
savings. More importantly, we show, within the context of a theoretical model in which two
generations jointly choose their consumption paths, the amounts of inter-generational financial
assistance, and whether to share the parental residence, that the option of co-residence facilitates
26

The restriction of having an eligible adult child for both older twins in the pair reduces the sample of older
twins by about one-third. While this sample is not therefore fully representative of all twins in the age group 46-60,
there is no obvious reason why this sample selection should bias the within-twin estimate of the co-residence effect.
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high savings rates for the young.
To test a number of assumptions embedded in the model and some of its predictions, we
exploited another feature of our data, the presence of adult twin pairs. Using a variety of standard
methods that exploit twins data, we obtained estimates that indicated support for the model,
including that individuals born into larger families provide less financial support to parents, have
lower human capital, and are more likely to co-reside with parents when young. Consistent with
these effects of family size, we found no effect of the number of siblings on the savings rates of
the young. We also found, consistent with the model, that inter-generational co-residence is
lower the higher the incomes of the young but higher when the parents have higher incomes and
that inter-generational co-residence, net of income, is associated with higher savings for the
young but not higher savings for the old.
All of these results, in addition to the direct evidence we adduce on the magnitudes of
financial transfers across generations, suggest that in urban China neither old-age support by the
young nor the one-child policy are major factors underlying the relatively high savings rates of
the urban young. Rather, currently high housing costs and the prevalence of inter-generational
shared housing, which itself is made more attractive when the price of housing services is high,
are key reasons for the higher savings rates for the urban young in China. Indeed, our results
suggest that if relaxing constraints on fertility increases family size, this will increase the amount
of inter-generational co-residence and may further raise the relatively high savings rates of the
urban young to the extent that the resulting population growth further increases housing costs.
While we have used data from China to explore the interrelationships between the joint
residence of two generations and life-cycle patterns of savings, our findings may have relevance
for many developing countries, many of which are experiencing both rising rates of intergenerational co-residence and rising urban housing costs. The linkage between savings and coresidence also suggests that there may be value in moving from the traditional unit for the
collection of survey data - the household - towards an approach that focuses on individuals and
families, and in which therefore a household roster is only one of many endogenous
characteristics of a family.
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Figure 3. % Saving Rate by Head’s Age in Japan (1974) and the United States (1972-73)
(Source: Hayashi, 1997)
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Figure 4. Total Household Income and Individual Income, by Age of Respondent
(Source: 2002 China Urban Household Survey)
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Figure 5. Fraction of Males Co-residing with Parents or In-Laws
and Who are Heads of Households, by Individual Age
(Source: 2002 UHS)
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Figure 6. Fraction of Males Co-residing with Parents or In-Laws , by Age and Sample
(Source: 2002 China Twin and Non-twin Surveys)
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Figure 7. Savings Rate, Men 25-60, by Age
(Source: Adult Twins and Non-Twins Data)
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Figure 8. Fraction of Males Relying Mainly on Family Financial Support, by Age
(Source: 2005 Chinese Mini Census)
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Figure 9. Mean Annual Net Transfer to Parents (Lowess-smoothed), by Age and Sample
(Source: 2002 China Twin and Non-twin Surveys)
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Table 1
Variable Means (Standard Deviations), by Sample: Males Aged 25-45
Variable

All Twins

First-birth Twins

All Singletons

Total siblings

2.57
(1.42)

2.38
(1.68)

1.84
(1.23)

Schooling (years)

11.5
(3.17)

12.2
(3.07)

11.8
(3.15)

Birthweight

2.53
(0.64)

2.50
(0.62)

3.19
(0.54)

Mother’s age at birth

28.1
(4.97)

25.9
(4.01)

28.2
(5.64)

Father in skill occupation

.515
(.500)

.563
(.497)

.439
(.497)

Mother in skill occupation

.284
(.451)

.362
(.481)

.239
(.427)

Age

33.9
(6.20)

32.2
(5.90)

37.2
(5.74)

Co-resident with parent

.487
(.500)

.563
(.497)

.364
(.482)

Any transfers to parent

.061
(.241)

.084
(.277)

.139
(.347)

Saving rate

.357
(.333)

.350
(.383)

.358
(.367)

Monthly wage

42.2
(29.3)

42.4
(29.1)

40.9
(23.1)

N

1124

422

364

Table 2
OLS Estimates of the Effects of Twinning on Number of Siblings, by Sample:
Male Respondents Aged 25-45
Sample

Singletons + All Households
with Twins

Singletons + Households
with First-birth Twins

Twin birth in household

.911
(10.6)

.437
(5.01)

Mother’s age at birth of twin

.0932
(9.11)

-.0292
(3.32)

Father skill occupation

.0307
(0.34)

-.118
(1.51)

Mother skill occupation

-.477
(5.07)

-.108
(1.60)

N

1,311

517

Absolute values of t-ratios clustered at the household level in parentheses.

Table 3
OLS and IV (Twins-First) Estimates of the Effects of Number of Siblings
on Schooling Attainment (Years): First-born Respondents Aged 25-45
Estimation procedure

OLS

IV (Twins-First)

Number of siblings

-.271
(1.92)

-.996
(2.06)

Father skill occupation

.868
(3.22)

.877
(3.24)

Mother skill occupation

.154
(0.60)

.0861
(0.32)

960

960

N

All specifications include the respondent’s sex, age and age squared. IV specification also
includes the mother’s age at first birth. Absolute values of t-ratios clustered at the household
level in parentheses.

Table 4
Single-equation and IV (Twins-First) Estimates of the Effects of Number of Siblings
on Transfers to Parents, Co-Residence with Parents and Savings Rate:
First-Born Males Aged 25-45 with at Least One Parent Alive
Variable

Transfers to Parents

Co-Reside with
Parents

Savings Rate

Estimation procedure

Probit

IV-Probit

Probit

IV-Probit

OLS

IV

Number of siblings

.0508
(0.45)

-.684
(2.05)

-.152
(1.52)

.648
(2.38)

.0121
(0.63)

.0801
(1.06)

Father in skill
occupation

.162
(0.89)

.0608
(0.33)

.180
(1.25)

.288
(2.05)

.0476
(1.38)

.0378
(1.08)

Mother in skill
occupation

.00677
(0.04)

-.0937
(0.58)

-.0182
(0.12)

-.00226
(0.02)

.0218
(0.60)

.0469
(1.29)

521

521

540

540

531

531

N
Wald test of exogeneity
(÷2(1),[p])
Durbin-Wu F [p]

3.98 [0.046]

6.31 [0.012]

-

-

-

1.28 [0.37]

All specifications include the respondent’s age and age squared. IV specifications also include
the mother’s age at first birth. Absolute values of t-ratios clustered at the household level in
parentheses.

Table 5
Estimates of the Effect of the Monthly Wage on Transfers to Parents, Co-Residence with
Parents and Savings Rate, by Estimation Procedure:
Male Twins Aged 25-45 with at Least One Parent Alive
Variable
Estimation
procedure
Daily wage
N

Transfers to Parents
Logit
- .00109
(0.28)
622

Co-Reside with Parents

Conditional
Logit

Savings Rate

Logit

Conditional
Logit

OLS

WithinTwin

-.00115
(0.15)

-.0122
(3.45)

-.0227
(2.03)

.000953
(2.12)

.000950
(2.04)

622

650

650

636

636

All OLS specifications include the respondent’s age and age squared and parent occupation
variables. Absolute values of t-ratios clustered at the household level in parentheses.

Table 6
Within-Twin and Within-Twin IV Estimates of the Effect of Co-Residence and Respondent
Income on Respondent Savings, by Generation: Male Twins Aged 25-45 and 46-60
Age group
Estimation procedure

25-45

46-60

Within-Twin

Within-Twin IV

Within-Twin

Within-Twin IV

Co-resident

1265.2
(1.65)

2960.5
(2.86)

316.5
(0.13)

316.3
(0.13)

Respondent Income

.0219
(2.04)

.226
(5.78)

.232
(7.00)

.257
(2.93)

N

1094

1094

322

322

The instrument for the within-twin IV estimates is the cross-twin report of annual earnings of
the respondent. Absolute values of t-ratios clustered at the household level in parentheses.

Appendix Tables

Table 1a
OLS Estimates of the Probaility of Being the Household Head:
Male respondents Aged 25+ in Households with 2+ Adult Males
(2005 Chinese Mini-Census)
Variable

Coefficient

Age

.00529
(6.81)

Oldest adult male

.373
(17.1)

Annual earnings

.000063
(7.95)

Highest-earning male

.0536
(4.70)

Family financial support is main income
source

-.238
(14.4)

Any non-earnings income

.0676
(4.03)

N
55,771
Absolute values of t-ratios clustered at the household level in parentheses.

Table 2a
OLS Estimates of the Effects of Twinning on Own Birthweight, by Sample:
Male Respondents Aged 25-45
Sample

All Births

First-births

Twin birth

-.638
(16.4)

-.633
(10.4)

Mother’s age at birth of twin

.00591
(1.37)

.0119
(1.33)

Father skill occupation

.0389
(0.86)

.0460
(0.56)

Mother skill occupation

-.101
(0.20)

-.0360
(0.45)

N

1,311

517

Absolute values of t-ratios clustered at the household level in parentheses.

Table 3a
OLS and Within-twin Estimates of the Effects of Birthweight on Schooling Attainment
(Years):
Male Twins Aged 25-45
Estimation procedure

OLS

Within-twin

Birthweight

0.0212
(0.16)

.0875
(0.45)

Father skill occupation

.906
(4.22)

-

Mother skill occupation

1.55
(7.59)

-

N

1,119

1,119

Absolute values of t-ratios clustered at the household level in parentheses.

Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1 that Sk2,*NC  Sk2,*C .
For this to be true the following must also be true:
Ck2,*NC  Ck2,*C  Ck2,*NC  k h.
Proof of the first inequality:
Given the assumed constant income stream for the young, it must be true that optimized
consumption is equal across periods for the non co-resident Ck2,*NC  Ck3,*NC . Moreover, for the coresident young in period 2 Ck2,*C  Ck3,*C because of the disutility of co-residence.
The second inequality can be proved as follows:
Assume that Ck2,*C  Ck2,*NC   k h , then we have

Ck3,*C  Ck2,*C  Ck2,*NC   k h,
from the first inequality. Thus it follows that

Ck2,*C  Ck3,*C  2Ck2,*NC  2 k h,
Note that the disposable income, denoted as Wd , under either regime is labor income ( 2Ew( N ) )

RP
). And the disposable income is used
N
for consumption and housing services. Under the non-co-residence regime,
Ck2,*NC  Ck3,*NC  2 k h  Wd . Because housing services are purchased in both periods 2 and 3 in
plus transfer (  ) minus old-age support to parents (

the non co-residence regime, it must hold that Wd  Ck2,*NC  Ck3,*NC  2 k h  2Ck2,*NC  2 k h  Wd ,
which in turn implies that Ck2,*C  Ck3,*C   k h  Ck2,*C  Ck3,*C  Wd . This is a contradiction.
Thus Ck2,*C  Ck2,*NC   k h , which leads to Sk2,*C  Sk2,*NC . That is, the optimal savings at period 2 under
the co-residence regime is larger than that under the non-co-residence regime.
Appendix B
Proof that an increase in the cost of housing services increases young savings in the co-residence
regime but not in the non-co-residence regime.
Optimal savings in the non-co-resident and co-resident regimes are given by
Sk2,*NC  Ew(N)    Ck2,*NC  k h,
Sk2,*C  Ew(N)    Ck2,*C.

To understand the impact of higher housing cost on young savings in period 2, we derive the
partial derivative of optimized consumption Ck2* with respect to k .
For the non-co-residence regime Ck2,*NC and Ck3,*NC are determined using

U k21,* NC  U k31,* NC,

RP
 2k h  2Ew(N)  .
N
and 2dCk*, NC  2hd  k  0, which in turn yields

Ck2,*NC  Ck3,*NC 

so that Ck2,*NC  Ck3,*NC  C*k, NC

Ck*, NC
 h,
 k

Sk2,*NC
 0.
 k
Housing costs have no impact on the optimal savings in period 2 for the young in the non-coresidence regime. This is because housing costs and consumption are equal across periods. In the
co-residence regime, however, a rise in the housing cost does not affect disposable income
Ew( N )   in period 2 but decreases resources available for consumption in the third period.
Savings must therefore increase in period 2 to maintain the equality of marginal utilities across
periods.
Appendix C
Proof that a permanent increase in the wage rate of the young reduces the relative utility of coresidence.
The impact of a permanent increase in the child’s wage on optimized utility in either regime
is always positive, and given by

 V NC  L *

C NC  2 E2 C*NC  2 EU k31 C*NC
w w
for the co-residence regime, and
V C L *

CC  2E2 C*C  2EU k31 C*C.
w w
for the non-co-residence regime, where λ2 is the Lagrangian associated with the income
constraint of the representative child.
Because, as shown, C*k, NC  C*k,C , the increase in V NC is larger than that in V C when there is
NC
C
a wage increase, so that DV  V NC  V C  0 , where DV  V  V . This implies that for
the family indifferent between the two regimes, a wage increase will induce a shift to non-coresidence.

Appendix D
Derivation of the relationship between the number of siblings and second-period savings in the
co-residence regime.
Under the co-residence regime, substituting into the budget constraint optimized
consumption in periods 2 and 3, we have

RP
dN .
N2
Given the equality of marginal utilities across periods, we also have the following relationship
for dCk2,*C and dCk3,*C :
dCk2,*C  dCk3,*C  2Ew'(N)dN 

U k211dCk2,*C  h1(N, Yp)U k212dN  U k311dCk3,*C ,
2
where U k11
is the partial derivative of U k21(Ck2, (N, Yp)h) with respect to the first argument, that

is, the second partial derivative of U k2 with respect to consumption. This is negative by
2
3
assumption. Similarly, U k12
is positive and U k11
is negative. From the last equation we can solve

dCk2,*C in terms of dCk3,*C . Furthermore, given second-period optimal savings, defined from the
2
2
period-2 savings function S k  Ew( N )    Ck we get

dSk2,*C  Ew' (N)dN  dCk2,*C .
Combining the above, we thus have
U k212


RP
2
Ew
'(
N
)


h'1 (N, Yp) 

3
2
N
U k11
 dN .
dSk2,*C  Ew' (N)dN  
2
U


1  k311


U k11

Appendix E
Proof that an increase in parents’ income increases the relative utility of co-residence.
The marginal impact of parents’ income, either in period 1 or 2, on family utility V is λ1,
the Lagrangian associated with the parent income constraint. It is easy to show that
1  U 31  U p21  U p31 . Under the non-co-residence regime we have

V NC
 1 C*p, NC  U p21 C*p, NC  U p31 C*p, NC .
Yp
Similarly, under the co-residence regime
V C
 1  U k22h2(N, Yp) C*p,k,C
Yp









 U p21  U k22h2(N, Yp) C*p,k,C





 U p31  U k22h2(N, Yp) C*p,k,C
where C*p,k indicates the vector of the optimal consumption levels of the parents and kids. Then

DV  V NC  V C





 U p21 C*p, NC  U p21  U k22h2(N, Yp) C*p,k,C

  U k22h2(N, Yp) C*k,C  0 ,
2

*

2

*

since U p1 C p, NC  U p1 C p,k,C . Thus, if the family is indifferent between regimes, an increase
in parental income would lead to the choice of co-residence.

